INTRODUCTION
Grammatical metaphor is one of the most interesting theoretical notions developed by Halliday (1985 Halliday ( /1994 within Systemic-Functional Grammar (SFG) . In this research paradigm, language is regarded as a semiotic system which comprises three different strata (discourse-semantics, lexicogrammar, and phonology) related to each other by means of subsequent realizations. Each realization involves making meaningful choices within the different systems which make up each stratum. Thus, discourse-semantics is realized through the lexicogrammar, which is in tum realized phonologically. With this general framework in mind, grammatical metaphor may be defined, broadly speaking, as a variation in the grammatical forms through which a semantic cholee is typically realized in the lexicogrammar. Halliday makes a distinction between two main types of grammatical metaphor: interpersonal metaphors (or metaphors of mood), and ideational metaphors (or metaphors of transitivity); only grammatical metaphors of the latter kind will concern us in this paper.
First, we shall critically review the most significant features of the standard account of grammatical metaphor which Halliday offers in his wellknown book An Introduction to Functional Grammar (1985 Grammar ( /1994 . Given its rather programmatical status, we shall go on to examine how other authors have fleshed out Halliday's initial analysis so that we can obtain a more complete picture of this phenomenon and of its implications for linguistic analysis. To the existing proposals we want to add some tentative considerations as to the possibility of refining the notion of grammatical metaphor from the perspective of some related findings in Cognitive Linguistics, namely Lakoff's (1987 Lakoff's ( , 1993 ) theory of conceptual metaphor, and Langacker's (1987 Langacker's ( , 1990 ) notional description of grammatical categories. This objective will probably be received with certain reservations by both convinced systemicists and cognitivists, but we find it quite plausible that both schools may fruitfully complement each other in many ways by virtue of their common functionalist orientation (although some cognitivists would not hesitate to invert the terms of the statement and argüe that it is functionalism that may be regarded as a kind of cognitive approach; e.g. see Lakoff 1990 ).
HALLIDAY'S STANDARD ACCOUNT
In SFG the clause is the result of a simultaneous mapping of choices from the ideational, interpersonal, and textual components of the grammar. mterpersonal function h^^;° ^^ ^"^^ The ideational function, with function with the ^^^^-^;^^;.^Z^;^Sl;, ,he transitivity system, which whichwe are concerned here,iscU,sely ti ^ ,.^j^^^ ^^^ "f enables us to '^-^^-^f ^^^ ^, ^'jJionX behavioural, verbal, and process types (material, '"«"\a' ^"'^^^ cónfiguration of transitivity existential). Processes -jeal^^^^ L partic^ants in the situation, the functions which -P--";,;^;j::^ associated with the attributes assigned to participan s, ana i participants process. Processes are ^yV^^^'^J^'^^^'^'l^^^^^^ (Actor, Senser,Phenomeno.Caner,et0^are^^^ y ^^^^^^^ ^^^ groups; participants '^""''"»^^ "" J. ^^, nerally associated with circumstances (of time, place, manner, «te) are g y ^^ adverbial groups or prepositiona f^^^^^^^^^ZnlZlt Lms), but lexicogrammatical -^>f "°"J;^to ^oten^^^^^ to the language other less typical -^/j^s) B wa'y of HuJtration, consider these two user (i.e. metaphoncal torms). oy way examples (taken from Downing 1991: 110-11 D-(,) We walked in the even.ng along the "ver to Henley. (2) Our evening walk along the nver took us to Henley. (Downing 1991: 112) . However, these metaphorical forms coexist with their congruent counterparts and, as will become evident later in our discussion, they also involve subtle -but important-differences in meaning or semantic variation.
In point of fact, in this paper we argüe that the existence of semantic variation may be safely posited for all instances of ideational grammatical metaphor. This Une of argument is not necessarily in disagreement with Halliday's standard account. Thus, he explicitly acknowledges that «different encodings all contribute something different to the total meaning» (Halliday 1994: 344) , and Martin (1992: 17) argües that «taking semantics as point of departure, choosing a metaphorical realisation means encoding additional layers of meaning»; the issue of semantic variation, however, is mainly taken for granted rather than explored in a systematic fashion. Moreover, the stress upon the status of grammatical metaphor as an altemative resource offered by a given language may erroneously lead us to overlook its signifícant implications at the discourse-semantic level. The question will be further discussed in Section 3 in relation to additional work in grammatical metaphor carried out by Ravelli (1988) ; in Section 4, we shall try to show in what way a cognitive approach may shed some light upon this somewhat weak aspect of Halliday's treatment.
Another important issue concems the substantially different role played by grammatical metaphor in spoken and written language. As pointed out by Halliday (1985 Halliday ( /1994 Halliday ( , 1989 , grammatical metaphor tends to occur much more technicaVacademic discourse) and in ™ ^P^^fl;^^'
. . ¿^^,^^ in written of the factors which contribute to the higher degree of lexK^al density English. Nominalizat.on is the main way m -^^^ ^^'^^^^^^ ^.^.p,, ^ melphor is often achieved by tuming clausd P^"^™^ "!XTr9^^^^ can he observed in the foUowing examples taken from Halhday (1994. ^ , . , alcohol impainnent is impaired by alcohol allocation of an extra packer they allocate an extra packer ^^ ^^.^^ ^^^^^^ some shorter, soma longer computer they were abie to reach the computer ü.e.r^access ^^^^^J technology is getting better Th. resource may f-iUtate textual ojjan^a^^^^^^ co.prehension,forinstance,byreintr«c^^^^^^^^^^^ ^_ ", may function as participants in a "^^ ^^^^ j" bo^h thematic and nominalization, processes may occupy certam Po^"¿°"^ "^ es infonnation structure which are typically ^^«^^J^^^* ~ * b^'placed in can become the point of departure of the '"^^^^^^.^f "^'¿^^la^e). On other the unmarked focus of Information (fmal P^^^^^J^^^^tHL it is not occasions, however, metaphorical ^^^^^ZZl^^y^^^^^^^ -*^ always possMe to arrive at <^^^^2^ZlTZ7^r. may be ambiguity, basis of the information provided by the "°™ ¿^d participants may as is the case with alcohol impairment, ^^^^^^^^^^Zn by the addressee). be impossible to retrieve unless they ^'/^'^^^l^Z.rxL written genres TT^at .s why the abundant ^^^f^^^^C^l^lZ^... (Halliday 1994 : «tends to mark off the expert fr°"; *os^ ^'^^ "f observations, advanced by 353). \n Section 4, we shall see how üns kma ^^^ ^^^ different authors within *e sy-« n^^^^^^ ^^ ,^^^^ 1992; Halliday 1993; ^^^^^^'^^^^JlLoJ^^^^^^^ character inherent m a cognitive accouní u 3. FURTHER ADVANCES metaphor has been further elaborated "^ ^^^.^^ gpg^.jai attention will be Halliday's fairly programmatical charac ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ grammatical devoted to RavelU's attempt to produce a ^^ ^^^j ^^ ^^ ^j^^ metaphor for its use in text analysis (Ravelh characterization of metaphorical modes of expressions as dynamic resources with which the users of a language are provided. Ravelli (1988) proposes a method of analysis to provide more detailed accounts of the way grammatical metaphor is used in real texts. This author establishes different types of grammatical metaphor and examines how they may be recognized through transitivity analysis to be later quantifíed for textual comparisons. After searching eight texts on the field of nuclear disarmament for occurrences of grammatical metaphor, Ravelli arrived at a more detailed classification, partially reproduced here with slight modifications: la. (HISTORICAL experience) . This classifícation is particularly useful in that it presents a more adequate picture of the scope of the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor beyond the most frequent instances typically studied under the heading of nominalization.
In a thought-provoking discussion, Ravelli (1988: 135-138) considers two different interpretations of grammatical metaphor directly related to our proposals in the following section. In the simpler interpretation, which is roughly in accordance with Halliday's standard account, metaphor is regarded as «an altemative lexicogrammatical realization of a cholee in the semantics» (Ravelli 1988: 136) . From this perspective, the same meaning may be realized in two (or more) ways: congruently or metaphorically. However, Ravelli (1988: 137) observes that «the grammatical category itself has a feedback into the semantics and altemative lexicogrammatical realizations may omit or include different parts of the message». In an attempt to incorpórate this meaning variation into a more satisfactory model of grammatical metaphor, Ravelli (1988: 137) , following some suggestions given by Halliday through personal communication, goes on to reinterpret the phenomenon as a compound of semantic features: «two (or more) meaning cholees come together in the semantics, forming a compound entry condition for a (combined) meaning, which gives rise to a metaphorical realization in the r 1 On the other hand, a congruent lexicogrammatical lexicogrammar [...] On ^he otner na ' ^ ^ f nient seems to realization derives from a single ^^'¡^^^.'¡Xloi^c it much further. In be quite promising but, unfortunately, Ravelh mis lo u^ addition this sketchy characterization apparently ^^ ""^^ *^^^^^^^^^ of semantic components is also involved m congnient '^^^l^^^^^^^ so it is at least questionable whether it is P-^^le to choose ^^¿^^'^^^ defining criterion for a -del f g-^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^,^ It is true that reading '^«-P^'^^^"^'"" ^TexistÍriiterature seems to activation of previous kn^-f^^f^^^J^^üi metaphorical language. As stated indícate that this is especially the case ^^ ^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^ ^.jj ^^^ ^e above,if the necessary information isnoi involved in a given able properly to identify the P-^f ^^ ^^j^ ^.^r ^s is the cause of the situation and how they are .^f^^^^^J^J^J^^edby Halliday & Martin (1993: inaccessibility of many scientific texts, as ciaime 21): «The language of science, though forward-looking in its origins, has become increasingly anti-democratic: its arcane grammatical metaphor sets apart those who understand it and shields it from those who do not»; Martin (1992) also refers to this phenomenon as «secret English». In contrast with this partly negative characterization, Goatly (1996) argües for the use of grammatical metaphor in the language of science by virtue of its alleged consonance with modem scientific theory (e.g. the so-called Gaia theory, which moves away from bodily-determined ontology): congruence is said to represent an anthropocentric (even infantile) ontology/ideology, whereas grammatical metaphor (especially nominalization) would appropriately underscore the primacy of processes independently of human Actors. Such an approach, however, seems to assume an objectivist view of reality which clearly contradicts current findings in the cognitive sciences. In the foUowing section, we address the issue of grammatical metaphor from just the opposite perspective: in terms of the very anthropocentric theoretical tenets of Cognitive Linguistics.
INSIGHTS FROM COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS
Cognitive linguists account for language phenomena by drawing on what is known about such basic human capacities as conceptualization and imagination. As opposed to other more formalist approaches, it is argued within this paradigm that language cannot be considered in isolation from its cognitive and communicative functions. Unfortunately, in spite of important theoretical affinities, systemicists and cognitivists tend to focus on their differences and rarely achieve the desirable symbiosis. However, it is possible to appreciate some cognitive overtones in the way Downing & Locke (1992: 10) remark that «[a] fundamental property of language is that it enables us to conceptualise and describe our experience, whether of the phenomena of the extemal world or of the intemal world of our thoughts, feelings and perceptions». Guillen (1994) has made use of some of the tools provided by Langacker's Cognitive Grammar (1987 , 1990 to reinterpret grammatical metaphor in terms of altérnate profilings on a common base (see 4.2. for discussion of this and related terminology); our own propKJsal, which roughly assumes the validity of Guillén's findings, further examines grammatical metaphor in the light of Cognitive Grammar -with emphasis on Langacker's notional description of grammatical categories-and the theory of conceptual metaphor. Finally, also within the cognitive paradigm, Ruiz de Mendoza (1999: 92) has put forward the parallel notion of grammatical metonymy to explain some cases of recategorization which involve a domainsubdomain relationship between generic cognitive constructs, as in the verb author, which focalizas the agent type of a process (cf. .riter), and cut (n.), which focalizes the result within an action frame. regarding grammatical that such a potential inadequacy may be s ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ specifically of metaphor as a special case of ^^"^'P^^^^.i^vel or specific categories. From metaphor based on genenc rather man u ^^,^1^ be understood in this standpoint, certain nominalizations, lor i^ ^^^^ PROCESSES ARE terms of a generic metaphor which "^^ / ^,y ^.^nceptualized as if they ENTITIES. By means of it processes are on g ^s. Category vanation were entities which may in tum take part m other pr is thus not a random choice, but a symptom in the grammar of a mapping between two different exp)eriential domains. Compare now the nominalization in (3a) below with the congruent versión given in (3b): The SFG analysis would typically account for these two clauses as different ways of expressing the same event, (3a) being a non-congruent form, and would deal with the specifics of how each choice has consequences for the organization of the clause and even of subsequent discourse. But we can further account for (3a) in terms of a combination of two generic metaphors: PROCESSES ARE ENTITIES and NON-PHYSICAL ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL CONTAINERS. Thus, a process is conceptualized as an entity which, by virtue of the CONTAINER image-schema, is seen to have another entity («Mary», a participant in the process) in its interior. In Cognitive Linguistics, imageschemata are abstract topological concepts which may function as structuring principies for many of our experiences and perceptions (Lakoff 1987 (Lakoff , 1989 Johnson 1987 ). An image-schematic model is made up of a set of basic structural elements arranged according to inherent logical constraints. Thus, the CONTAINER schema mainly consists of a bounded región, a boundary and an exterior; our experience tells us that the container may somehow affect the entities within it (e.g. by isolating them from extemal influence). In (3), the pratential activation of this image-schematic knowledge is made p)ossible by the generic metaphoric mapping PROCESSES ARE ENTITIES, since containers are typically entities (although it should be noted that the CONTAINER imageschema itself is a conceptualization which we impose on our spatial experience and of course it does not necessarily involve any actual physical boundary).
Generic conceptual metaphor
Other changes in grammatical category also respond to metaphoric mappings of this kind. In this sense, we can reinterpret the examples in Ravelli's classification of grammatical metaphors (Section 3) in terms of generic conceptual mappings: e.g. we map processes onto qualities of physical objects (INCOMING Soviet missiles), qualities onto things (peace through STRENGTH), circumstances onto processes (night FOLLOWS day), and so on.
In the standard systemic-functional account, however, phenomena of conceptual interaction involving grammatical metaphor are left unexplained. In contrast, a cognitive account along the lines presented here may help us to refine our analysis by attending to such semantically relevant aspects. Moreover, understanding ideational grammatical metaphor as the result of a conceptual tr etrrpreíing iran^Lical Grammar. As mentioned ^>'°;^\^';^, ^^^.j^ "ew since it has already been metaphorinthelightof^ismodel^^^^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^.^^ ^^^ ^ put forward by Guillen (1994) . However, wc s loi Lghtlydiffere^nt-ifrelated aspectofC^^^^^^^ _ ^^ According to L-g-k^ (1987 1990^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^ conceptualization of any kmd (a smgle co P ^^^ ,1,^ perceptual experience) which funcUons as ^ -g^ ^ ^,.^, i, ^,de characterization of a semantic unit Such ^ characten^ against a number of ^0-^--^^f p^L^^^^^^^^^^^ strucTure. betweenabaseandaprofile^Thebase,^ ^^.^^ ^^ the part of the relevant domams (scope oi P . -^^^ take as the profSing of a given substructure '^^^^f^^JZ^Z^^lé by water, a base the conception of a bo^y ^ -^ -J J^J ^ ^^^^ ^, ^^ ^,," specific expression may profile the lana y ^shoreline), and so ithe water near the island), the boundary ^^^^^^^ "J^^^j^nt n,ay be construed on(Langackerl990:62).Agiyensceneorconce^^^^^^ ¿^^^ ^^^^^^ in different ways; in a simüar fashion as po^nt^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^ ^ ^^^ metaphorical '"^alizations may devate^^^^^^ ^ obliterated. For instance, in degree of prominence whUe °*^^ !~^^ J" ^/,,,/r/mp^rranc. ana .c«pe a metaphorical express.on such as ^hejeal^atto^^^ ^^^^^ .^ ^^^ ^^^^.^^^ was developing very slowly, "^^/S^" . . metaphor to structure conceptual Inourview,thiscapacityofgrammaüca«P^^^^^^^^ understood with material in meaningful ways may . j ^ategories. In accordance regard to the notional descnptton "^/J^^IÜ, ^ cognitive basis, Langacker with his basic tenet that grammar is enuu possible for basic (1990) convincingly argües that -^'^^ ''^^fX^^-s, at a high level of grammatical categories such as nouns ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^-^^ (^ región in some schematicity, the semantic pole ot a nuu e e_tities); on the other hand, ^ :_ J."uv,.u.A hv a set of interconnected entine ;, domain, established by a set verbs desígnate processes (relations with a temporal profile), and adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, infinitives, and participles desígnate different kínds of complex atemporal relations. In more general terms, nominal predícations presuppose the ínterconnectíons among entítíes and profile the región as a whole, whereas relational predications presuppose the sets of entities and profile the interconnections among them. This distinction allows Langacker to explain the subtle meaning differences we can find between words such as circle and round, or group £ind together.
It should not be difficult to point out the main implications that this kind of analysis may have for a better understanding of the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor. Thus, for instance, the reification traditionally associated with nominalizations may be defined within this unified framework as a variation in construal and profiling. By way of illustration, the following expressions may be used by two different people in order to report the same event (Langacker 1990: 98): (4) Something exploded! (5) There was an explosión.
The different wordings in (4) and (5) are semantically motivated at the conceptual level. In (4), the congruent verbal form exploded profiles a series of States coordinated in a dynamic way through sequential scanning. These states are conceived of as a set of interconnected entities which presuppose an implicit región. In (5), however, the nominalization explosión makes this región conceptually more salient and presupposes the set of interconnected entities.
Similarly, in the congruent expression Night comes after day the preposition after profiles an atemporal relation (in spite of its meaning, the temporal dimensión is latent rather than highlighted), and primary characterization in the cognitive domain of time only occurs when the prepositional phrase combines with a verb (here comes) in a higher-order structure. In the metaphorical versión Night follows day, however, the relation between the entities night and day is construed as an entity which undergoes a sequence of stages through conceived time. The construal shift may also be found in the opposite direction, as in incoming Soviet missiles, where the sequential scanning which characterizes processes is replaced by the summary scanning typically associated with atemporal relations.
This kind of account is undoubtedly compatible with the dynamic character of grammatical metaphor. By making a selection as regards grammatical category, a speaker is imposing his own conceptualization of a given situation or event on the hearer. Thus, for instance, profiling the implicit o .-othí.r than the interconnections among the región described by a process rather than me '"'^^ ¡^ as in'olved entines enables us to focus on that P™'=^^!^^^'V; ""iTf/^hd^e may a coherent whole regarded in isolation from .ts part.c.pants.
-^^^^l^^^ etaphor to conceptualization potential. T^^s capacUy g ^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ structure experiential domains in certain preí^rrea y human conceptualization, which connects ^^^ P^ «^ 7^;7;^^^^1 . ,. ",, analysis in tenns of metaphoric -PP^f ^7^^^"^ ,7lTeov^ all the components of a g.ven domain ^e «"^PPf ¿ '^ j^, mechanism metaphor is obviously a matter «f-"«7''^^^^^ ' ^/.Xent grammatical relattng the altérnate profüings "^P^^^J^^ j ; ; ; "It act schemata which categories is ult.mately but a -^^^^¿¿^^^'^^^^.^GS, TEMPORAL those categories instantiate (e.g. PROj;^^^^^^^^ . RELATIONS ARE ATEMPORAL RELATIONS, etc.).
CONCLUSIÓN
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